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A. FORM OF ORGANIZATION-PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
1. Purpose of Professional Association Act. Enactment of the Pennsyl-
vania Professional Association Act' now enables two or more lawyers 2 who
* A.B., 1953, The City College of the College of the City of New York (Phi Beta
Kappa); 1953-55, Harvard Law School; LL.B., 1956, Columbia Law School; asso-
ciated with the law firm of McNees, Wallace & Nurick, Harrisburg, Pa.; member
of the Dauphin County and Pennsylvania Bars.
The subjects considered in this article are discussed only to the extent of aspects
peculiar to attorneys' tax liability. No attempt is made to give general coverage to
these subjects.
1. Pa. Laws 1961, act 416. Under the act an association which will render a par-
ticular kind of professional service may be formed by associates who are all qualified to
render that professional service. Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, §§ 3, 4. The articles of associa-
tion, containing the name of the association, its principal office address, the names
and addresses of the associates, and a general purpose clause, must be filed with the
local prothonotary. Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 5. The associates, according to propor-
tionate ownership interests, Pa. laws 1961, act 416, § 16, elect a board of governors,
which may consist of one or more persons who need not be associates, to manage the
association's affairs. The board has the power to hire employees, who may be associates,
Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 8, establish their salaries, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 9, and
determine what portion of the net earnings shall be distributed to the associates (in
proportion to their ownership interests), Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 10. The asso-
ciates are liable jointly, or jointly and severally, for the liabilities of the association.
Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 17. Any associate no longer legally qualified to render the
professional services which are the purpose of the association must be expelled. Pa.
Laws 1961, act 416, § 18. Each associate or his estate and each expelled associate may
transfer his interest to anyone qualified to render the professional services involved, sub-
ject to any restrictions imposed in the by-laws, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, §§ 12, 18, and
pursuant to agreement the association may redeem the interests of associates, expelled
associates or their estates, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 13. The association may be
dissolved by a majority vote (or any larger vote required by the by-laws) of asso-
ciates voting in accordance with their ownership interests. Pa. Laws 1961, act 416,
§ 19.
2. The choice between individual and group practice of law is based primarily
upon considerations other than federal income taxes.
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would heretofore have practiced as a firm to choose between a partnership
and a professional association.a The Professional Association Act was
drafted to permit those persons whose profession forbids their practicing
through a corporation to form an organization which is a "corporation" for
all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.4 The Treasury Regula-
tions 5 specify the characteristics an organization must have in order to be an
"association," which is taxed as a corporation. If a professional association
qualifies as an association, and the associates6 conform to the apparent
requirement 7 in Pennsylvania that they become employees of the association,
then they will also be treated for federal tax purposes as employees of the
association.8 This has several tax advantages.
2. Tax Advantages of a Professional Association. The major tax ad-
vantage for a professional association taxable as a corporation is probably
that an associate-employee may be one of the beneficiaries of pension, profit-
sharing,9 stock bonus, and annuity plans, which, if they are non-discrimina-
tory and otherwise qualified under Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, provide substantial tax benefits over investment programs that are
not so qualified.10 Other advantages relate to group life insurance cover-
3. Subject to any restrictions on lawyers imposed by professional ethics. Cf. Pro-
fessional Association Act, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 4. The Committee on Professional
Ethics of the American Bar Association expects to render an opinion prior to 1962
as to the propriety of law firms practicing as entities, such as the professional asso-
ciation, that are taxable as corporations. 6 AM. B. NEws, Oct. 15, 1961, p. 2. See notes
40, 52 and 65 infra.
4. "The term 'corporation' includes associations, joint stock companies, and insur-
ance companies." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (3).
5. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
6. Owners of the proprietary interests in the association. Professional Associa-
tion Act, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 2(1).
7. See Op. ATT'y GEN. No. 243, Sept. 27, 1961, n.12, and last sentence.
8. See Rev. Proc. 61-11, 1961 INT. REV. BULL. No. 18, at 53. For federal tax
purposes no one can be an employee of a partnership of which he is a partner. Id. at 54.
9. Query whether professional ethics will prohibit the use of a profit-sharing plan
where lay employees are covered, on the ground that this would constitute the sharing
of professional fees with a layman in violation of Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics. Report of the Special Committee to Cooperate With ABA Committee on
Professional Ethics Re Associations of Attorneys Taxable as Corporations, A.B.A.
SECTION OF TAXATION BULL. October 1961, at 41, 53. Cf. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 185
(1953).
10. In general, the amounts contributed under a qualified plan are, subject to
limitations as to amount, deductible in determining the taxable income of the employer.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 404. The employees covered by the plan do not include any
of the amounts contributed in their gross income for that year, Treas. Reg. § 1.402
(a)-1(a) (1) (i) (1956), except for the amounts allocable to life insurance protection,
Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(3) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6497, 1960-2 Cum. BULL.
19.
Any earnings of a qualified trust are exempt from federal income tax, INT. REV.
CODE Of 1954, § 501 (a).
Upon termination of employment or death, if the employee or his estate or benefi-
ciary receives in one taxable year all of the benefits to which he is entitled under the
plan, then the entire amount is taxed at capital gains rates, INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
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age," medical, surgical, hospitalization and dismemberment insurance, 12 and
health and accident plans.
13
There is another tax reduction advantage, 14 independent of employee
benefit plans, which results from the creation of a new taxpaying entity.
The association taxed as a corporation is subject to federal tax at 30 percent
of income up to 25,000 dollars, 15 and Pennsylvania corporate net income
tax' 6 of 6 percent. 17 If a group of lawyers were practicing in partnership,
the partners would pay federal income taxes at individual tax rates on the
§ 402(a) (2), except that the proceeds of life insurance protection, Treas. Reg. § 1.402
(a)-l(a) (4) (i) (b) (1956), and in some cases the first $5,000 of death benefits,
Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a) (4) (i) (c) (1956), are receivable free of income tax. If
received under any other circumstances, all amounts paid to the employee are taxed at
ordinary income rates under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 72, relating to annuities, ex-
cept that § 72(e)(3) is not applicable. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 402(a)(1). If an
employee dies before retirement, then any death benefits, other than those constituting
life insurance proceeds or payable to his estate, are free from the federal estate tax,
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2039(c), Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(d) (1958). For require-
ments for exemption from Pennsylvania inheritance and estate taxes, see Inheritance
and Estate Tax Act of 1961, § 316, Pa. Laws 1961, act 207, § 316.
Therefore, under a qualified plan, the funds are accumulated and invested almost
entirely free from income taxes until benefits are distributed to the employee. In
addition, distribution to the beneficiary ordinarily results in taxation at lower income
tax rates than he was paying while he was employed, because of the graduated income
tax rates, his probably reduced earnings after retirement, and the retirement income
credit, INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 37, or the maximum 25% tax on long-term capital
gains, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1201(b).
11. If the association pays the cost of group term life insurance coverage for
employees, then, whether or not they are also associates, the amounts paid will be
deductible in determining the association's taxable income, Adolph G. Rosengarten, 12
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 297 (1943), but will not be includible in the gross income of the
employees, Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (2) (1956).
12. If an employer pays the cost of medical, surgical, or hospitalization insurance,
or insurance against dismemberment, then the employer may deduct these costs in
determining its taxable income, Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1958), and the employee
excludes these contributions from his gross income, INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 106. The
employee may also exclude from his gross income amounts collected under such insur-
ance policies on account of dismemberment or as reimbursement for medical care ex-
penses for himself, his spouse, and his dependents, except to the extent that these medical
expenses were deducted in prior years. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 105(b) and (c).
13. If an employer continues the salary of an employee while he is absent from
work on account of personal injuries or sickness, then the employer may deduct the en-
tire amount paid, Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1958), but the employee may exclude the
amount paid up to a weekly rate of $100 (except for the first seven calendar days of
absence in the case of an employee absent on account of sickness and not hospitalized
for at least one day during those seven days), INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 105(d). If
the employer provides these benefits by paying for an insurance policy, then he may. de-
duct the cost of the premiums, Treas. Reg. § 1.16 2 -10(a) (1958), but the employee
excludes the amount of these premiums from his gross income, INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 106.
14. Not available if election is made under Sub-chapter S, see Part I A5, p. 83 infra.
15. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 11.
16. See notes 72 and 73 infra and accompanying text.
17. Corporate Net Income Tax Act § 3, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420c
(Supp. 1960).
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entire taxable income of the partnership.' 8 If any partner's individual federal
tax bracket was over 36 percent,' 9 and it was desirable to distribute less
than all of the net earnings, 20 then their taxes might be lower if they practiced
in a professional association and set their salaries as employees at a level which
would keep the association's corporate taxes at 36 percent and their individual
taxes at no more than 36 percent. Each associate could realize his share of
the accumulated profits at capital gains rates by selling his interest, or his
estate could realize his share without further income tax by selling it promptly
after his death.
21
3. The Treasury Regulations and the Professional Association. The
professional association is intended to qualify as an association taxable as a
corporation under the Treasury Regulations. 22 At this writing, there has
been no ruling 23 by the Internal Revenue Service with respect to any
organization formed under the Pennsylvania Professional Association Act
18. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 701.
19. This rate is reached at $20,000 of taxable income by a lawyer filing a joint
return, at $14,000 of taxable income by an attorney filing as head of a household, and
at $10,000 of taxable income by all others. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1, 2.
20. As might be the case if the partners were making payments on a mortgage or
otherwise buying capital assets.
21. When its basis will be equal to its fair market value, INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 1014, so that there would be no gain, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1001.
22. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960). If a group of attorneys fails in its attempt
to be taxed as a corporation, it would ordinarily be taxed as a partnership, which ordi-
narily would impose only those tax liabilities that would have existed had they formed
an ordinary partnership, except for any Pennsylvania taxes. See text accompanying notes
72 and 73 infra.
23. Rev. Proc. 61-11, supro note 8, establishes the procedure for obtaining a de-
termination from the District Director as to the related issues of the status of an
association and the existence of an employer-employee relationship between it and its
owners. This procedure is applicable only where these issues arise in connection with a
request for a determination that an employee plan qualifies under INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 401, and results in a preliminary determination with respect to these issues. In
making his request for a determination as to the employee plan, the employer must
submit a brief with respect to the association's status and its relationship with the
alleged employees, together with copies of all relevant documents and a statement of
all pertinent facts. The employer should then ask for an oral discussion of these issues
in the National Office of the Internal Revenue Service. If the District Director's opin-
ion is that the employer is an association taxable as a corporation and that the requisite
employer-employee relationship exists, or if he wishes the views of the National Office
of the Internal Revenue Service, he will refer the case to the National Office together
with his findings and recommendations. The National Office will determine the status
of the organization and the alleged employees. If the District Director determines that
the organization is not an association taxable as a corporation, or that its associates are
not employees, it will so advise the organization. There is no appeal from an un-
favorable determination by the District Director or the National Office. Treas. Reg.
§ 601.201, 26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (1961).
Suit for declaratory judgement in the U.S. District Courts is not available, 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (1959), Noland v. Westover, 172 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1949), whether the
determination is unfavorable or the procedure established by Rev. Proc. 61-11, note 8
si pra, is inapplicable, as it would be if no employee plan was proposed. The taxpayers
would have to take their chances on the ordinary audit and appeal procedures that
follow the filing of a return.
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or comparable laws. The Regulations 24 indicate that, in order to qualify,
an organization must first have "associates '2  and the purpose of conducting
a business for profit. 26 Additionally, the organization must have more cor-
porate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics.2 7 The following
are corporate characteristics :28 (1) Continuity of life-the attribute of an
organization's continuing without alteration of identity regardless of the
death, withdrawal, insanity, or other disability of any of its associates.29
(2) Centralization of management-the attribute whereby any person or
group which does not include all of the associates has the exclusive power
to make independent business decisions not requiring ratification by the
associates.30  (3) Limited liability-the attribute whereby the associates are
not personally liable for the debts of the association.3 ' (4) Free transfera-
bility of interests-the attribute whereby each member, without the consent
of other members, has the power to confer upon one who is not a member
all of the attributes of his interest in the organization ;32 but if each member
has this power only after offering his interest to the other members at fair
market value, then there is a modified form of free transferability of interest,
with somewhat less significance.a Furthermore, there may be other charac-
teristics which in a particular case may determine whether or not
the organization has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate
characteristics.:
4
Of the four corporate characteristics listed, the professional association
24. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) and (2) (1960).
25. By using the plural, the Regulations indicate that a professional association
formed with but a single associate would not qualify, although § 3 of the Professional
Association Act permits a single associate to form a professional association. What
would happen upon the death or withdrawal of one of two associates is not clear. Nor
it is clear whether an association could qualify under the Regulations, for example, with
one associate owning 99% of the association and one or more others owning the bal-
ance.
26. There appears to be no reason why an association of lawyers would not
qualify in this respect.
27. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960).
28. And the absence of each is presumably a noncorporate characteristic.
29. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) and (b) (1960).
30. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) and (c) (1960).
31. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) and (d) (1960).
32. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) and (e) (1960).
33. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960). The effect of this lesser significance
is not indicated in the Regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g), Example (1),
(5) and (6) (1960). Perhaps where additional characteristics are involved, see note
34 infra, the lesser significance of a modified form of free transferability will determine
whether an organization qualifies.
34. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960). Since the Regulations were drafted
before the Treasury Department had any appreciable experience with the type of organ-
izations they cover, the fact that no examples of these other characteristics are given
should not be taken as an indication that they will not be significant in particular cases.
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has continuity of life,35 but it does not have limited liability.36  Therefore,
in order to have a majority of the corporate characteristics listed in the
Regulations, the professional association must have centralization of manage-
ment and at least some recognized form of free transferability of interests.
Centralization of management can be met by an association with two
or more associates, at least in form, by having a board of governors which
does not include all of the associates.37 This would in form meet the require-
ments of the Regulations 38 since Section 6 of the Professional Association
Act3 9 provides that the board of governors electel by the associates shall
manage all of the affairs of the association,40 and the Act empowers the
board to hire employees, 41 set their salaries42 and determine what portion of
the net earnings of the association is to be distributed among the associates
in proportion to their ownership interests. 43 To permit a two-associate
association to meet the requirement of centralization of management, the board
of governors may consist of one person. 44 However, it may be that the
Treasury Department will impose and try to enforce an additional require-
ment that managerial decisions be made without the prior acquiescence of
those associates who are not on the board of governors.45  No problem of
qualification arises from the Pennsylvania rule46 that at least a majority
of the members of the board be attorneys who are members of the association,
35. "Neither death, bankruptcy, resignation, expulsion, insanity, retirement, nor
transfer or redemption of the interest, of any associate, shall cause its dissolution."
Professional Association Act, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 14.
36. Professional Association Act, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 17, which is compara-
ble to Uniform Partnership Act §§ 13-15, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 35-37 (1930).
37. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960), Professional Association Act, Pa. Laws
1961, act 416, § 6.
38. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960).
39. Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 6.
40. For an attorney to practice subject to the direction of a board of governors
consisting entirely of attorney-associates would seem not to violate Canon 31 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, requiring an attorney to be free to choose his clients,
or Canon 35, which forbids an attorney's services from being controlled by any lay
agency intervening between him and the client, any more than these Canons are vio-
lated by the many attorneys now practicing as employees of law partnerships. Some
acceptance of this position is indicated in Report of the Special Committee to Cooperate
With ABA Committee on Professional Ethics Re Associations of Attorneys Tax-
able as Corporations, A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION BULL. October 1961, at 41, 50-51.
Query whether the same could be said of an association whose board includes a minority
of non-attorneys, as may be suggested by Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 243, Sept. 27, 1961.
41. Professional Association Act, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 8.
42. Professional Association Act, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 9.
43. Professional Association Act, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 10.
44. Professional Association Act, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 6.
45. This will be a difficult thing for the Internal Revenue Service to enforce, and
the Service might in some manner impose on the association the burden of showing
that this suggested requirement is met. If this requirement is imposed, it would prove
most difficult for those associations made up of relatively few associates with approxi-
mately equal interests.
46. See Op. ATT'Y. GEN. No. 243, Sept. 27, 1961.
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or from a possible requirement47 that all members of the board be attorneys
and associates.
48
The requirement of free transferability of interests was intended by
the draftsmen of the Professional Association Act to be met by Section 12
which reads:
Transfer of Interests. Any association or the personal repre-
sentative of his estate may transfer in whole or in part his interest
in a professional association, provided, however, that the transferee
shall be licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render the same
kind of professional service which the professional association was
organized to render. If any restrictions are imposed on the right to
transfer, such restrictions shall be specifically set forth in the by-
laws of the association and reference to the restriction shall be set
forth either generally or specifically on any certificates which evi-
dence ownership in the association.
Nothing in this section would prevent the association from meeting the require-
ment pf free transferability of interests. 49 Nor would this attribute be lost by
the requirement of Section 18 of the act that any associate no longer quali-
fied to render professional services be expelled, ° or by the authority granted
to the association in Section 13 to redeem the interest of any associate or
expelled associate or his estate, pursuant to prior agreement. However, in
finding the professional association to have free transferability of interests,
problems may be raised by the suggested requirement that all associates must
be employees, 1 by professional ethics,5 2 or by restrictions that may be im-
47. See note 40 supra.
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.7701-2(c) (2) (1960) (semble).
49. But see Report of the Special Committee to Cooperate With ABA Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics Re Associations of Attorneys Taxable as Corporations,
A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION BULL. October 1961, at 41, 52, which suggests that the
restriction on transferability of interests to lawyers only may be one of the other
characteristics referred to in Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960), which tends
toward making the organization noncorporate.
50. However, this might be one of the "other" characteristics referred to in Treas.
Reg. § 3 01.770 1-2 (a) (1) (1960), see note 34 supra which tends toward making the
association non-corporate.
51. See note 7 supra. The problem is raised by the following argument: Since
all associates must be employees, and power of employment is given to the board of
governors (which must be primarily or wholly composed of associates and which
is elected by all of them), the associates or some of them can effectively exercise a veto
over the transferee of any interest by causing the board of governors to refuse to hire
him; for practical purposes this amounts to the forbidden need for consent "of other
members," Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1) (1960). See Report of the Special Com-
mittee to Cooperate With ABA Committee on Professional Ethics Re Associations of
Attorneys Taxable as Corporations, A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION BULL. October
1961, at 41, 53. One answer that has been suggested is to have the by-laws require the
employment of each associate at reasonable compensation. (But such a provision may
be ineffective in view of the statutory grant to the board of governors of power to hire
employees. Professional Association Act, Pa. Laws 1961, act 416, § 8. Alternatively,
it may be interpreted as unduly violating centralization of management, Treas. Reg.
1961]
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posed by agreement.5 3
If a professional association is held not to be an association as defined
in Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2 (1960), an attempt should be made to have it
recognized as a joint-stock company taxable as a corporation.
5 4
4. Partnership Associations and Registered Partnerships. Aside from
the professional association, the partnership association55 and the registered
§ 301.7701-2(c) (1960), by giving each associate the power to force any attorney
on the association as an employee by transferring a part of his interest to him. And
as a practical matter, lawyers may not want to take the chance of being compelled
to find and use indirect methods to prevent an undesirable transferee from joining them
in their practice.) A second suggested answer is that the board's power of employ-
ment must be exercised in a fiduciary capacity, cf. Business Corporation Law § 408,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (1958), for the benefit of the common good
of the association rather than for the individual benefit of the board members
or of less than all of the associates. Cf. Higgins v. Chenango Pottery Co., 256
F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1958); 13 Am. JUR. Corporations § 997 (1938); 9 P.L.E.
Corporations § 202 (1958). In effect, the board members who are associates must act as
if they were not associates. This being the case, it is not the members of the associa-
tion who may refuse to hire a transferee and prevent him from lawfully exercising
the attributes of an associate, but rather the board of governors. A third suggested
answer is that the Regulations merely require each member to have the power to
transfer to another all his ownership interests. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1) (1960).
It is arguable that the Attorney-General's Opinion does not prevent this, but merely
forbids the association from actively practicing its profession so long as it has an
associate intended not to be hired or an associate who has been such for an appreciable
time and has not been hired. See Op. ATT'Y. GEN. No. 243, Sept. 27, 1961.
52. Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides, "No division of fees
for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service
or responsibility." It has been suggested that this Canon might require "some provision
for frequent and compulsory adjustment of stock ownership . . . to insure that dis-
tributions from year to year will be based on service or responsibility." Report of the
Special Committee to Cooperate with ABA Committee on Professional Ethics Re
Associations of Attorneys Taxable as Corporations, A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION BULL.
October 1961, at 41, 53. It is not indicated why this provision would be required for
an association any more than for a partnership. It has likewise been suggested that if
earnings are accumulated and are to be distributed when ownership interests are no
longer appropriately related to the service and responsibility at the time the fees were
earned, then Canon 34 requires either that there must be "rigid formulas to determine price
so that the seller receives exactly his due for his past services and the buyer cannot
benefit from past accumulation of fees," or that "maintenance of the proper relation-
ships in the case of realizations by sale of the stock will be troublesome." Id. This
problem would seem not to arise until and unless there is a sale of an interest at an
improper amount.
53. To what extent will restrictions imposed by voluntary agreement among the
associates, to which the association is not a party, be taken into account in determining
whether the association has the attribute of free transferability of interest? Will it
matter whether these agreements are entered into concurrently with the formation of
the association or afterwards? To what extent will voluntary agreements between
the association and the associates be taken into account? If on the basis of the agree-
ments that are taken into account, an associate may not transfer his interest to anyone,
unless the transferee is approved by one or more associates, then probably not even a
modified form of transferability exists. Treas. Reg. § 301. 7 7 01-2(e) (1960); Report
of the Special Committee to Cooperate With ABA Committee oi Professional Ethics
Re Associations of Attorneys Taxable as Corporations, A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION
BULL. October 1961, at 41, 52.
54. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (3), quoted in note 4 supra.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 341-461 (1930 and Supp. 1960).
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partnership ',6 may be used in Pennsylvania to qualify as associations taxable
as corporations under the Regulations.Y7 They can have associates, 5 busi-
ness purpose, 59 continuity of life,6 0 centralization of management (except
for a partnership association with only three members),61 and limited liabil-
ity6 2 and, if appropriate by-laws are adopted, they may have free transfer-
ability of interests.6
The Pennsylvania Attorney General has ruled14 that upon meeting
stated requirements physicians may practice in a partnership association as
well as in a professional association. It would appear that this may also be
true of attorneys.65  However, there are inconveniences in the use of a
partnership association66 and a registered partnership67 that are avoided in
the professional association.
5. Sub-Chapter S. If a professional association meets the requirements
of the Regulations,6" and comes within the definition of a corporation in
Section 7701 (a) (3), then it is a corporation69 for the purpose of Sub-
chapter S, 70 which authorizes a corporation and its shareholders to elect
to have the income of the corporation taxed directly to the shareholders,
much in the manner that the partners of a partnership are taxed. However,
a professional association with more than ten associates would not be able
to take advantage of this election.71
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 241-321 (1930).
57. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 341 (1930) (partnership association, three or more
persons); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 241 (1930) (registered partnership, two or more
persons).
59. Ibid.
60. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 421 (1930) (partnership association) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59, § 292 (1930).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 401 (1930) (partnership association, at least three
managers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 263 (registered partnership).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 381 (1930) (partnership association); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59, § 261 (1930) (registered partnership).
63. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 383 (1930) (partnership association); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 269 (1930) (registered partnership).
64. Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 243, Sept. 27, 1961.
65. The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that attorneys may make use of the
Professional Service Corporation Act, Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-64. In re The Florida Bar,
30 U.S.L. WEEK 2177 (Fla. Oct. 11, 1961).
66. The word "Limited" must be the last word of the partnership association's
name, which must appear fully in a conspicuous place in the association's office and on
its correspondence. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 382 (1930). The signatures of at least
two managers are needed to bind the association for any debt exceeding $500. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 401 (1930).
67. A list of the partners must be posted in a public place in the partnership's
office containing the capital subscribed and paid by each partner, and the words "Lim-
ited Liability" after the name of each partner. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 265 (1930).
68. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(b) (1959).
70. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371-1377.
71. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 13 7 1(a) (1).
1961]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
6. Pennsylvania Taxes. The professional association appears to be
subject to the Pennsylvania capital stock and corporate net income taxes.
The capital stock tax is imposed upon every corporation (other than cer-
tain non-profit corporations), "and every joint-stock association, limited
partnership, and company whatsoever," organized or incorporated under
any laws of Pennsylvania. 72 The corporate net income tax is imposed upon
every corporation with capital stock, joint-stock association, or limited part-
nership, which does business in Pennsylvania, or has capital or property used
in Pennsylvania or carries on activities in Pennsylvania. 73 The professional
association would appear to be a joint-stock association for the purposes of
these acts. 74 The professional association would appear not to be subject
to any taxes imposed only on corporations, limited partnerships, 75 partner-
ship associations, or registered partnerships, because these terms do not
describe the professional association.
B. METHOD OF ACCOUNTING; RECORD-KEEPING; FRAUD AND NEGLIGENCE
PENALTIES
Attorneys would ordinarily benefit from the use of the cash receipts and
disbursements method of accounting, 76 since they ordinarily pay their ex-
penses as they are incurred but receive payment of fees sometime after they
have been earned. 77 An attorney who is also engaged in another trade or
business may use a different method of accounting for his profession and
for each trade or business. 78 However, a complete and separable set of books
and records must be kept for each trade or business.
79
Each attorney should keep such permanent books of account as are suf-
ficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or other
matters germane to his tax returns. 80 The forms and systems of accounting
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 1871, 1901, 1902 (1949 and Supp. 1960).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3420b, 3420c.
74. See the description of the attributes of a "joint-stock company" in Oliver's
Estate, Appeal of Merchant's Fund Association, 136 Pa. 43 (1890).
75. The professional association is not "limited" and it is not a "partnership."
"Limited partnership" in the taxing acts has been interpreted to refer to the partnership
association, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 341-461 (1930 and Supp. 1960), and the registered
partnership, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 241-321 (1930), but not to the entity authorized
by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 171-228 (1930).
Commonwealth v. Biddle & Henry, 2 D. & C. 705 (Pa. 1923), following Op. ATT'v.
GEN.-In re Taxation of Limited Partnerships, 5 Pa. Dist. 288 (1896), and Op. ATT'Y.
GEN.-Limited Partnership Taxation, 28 County Ct. 582 (Pa. 1903).
76. Authorized by INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 446(c) (1).
77. An attorney who ordinarily receives substantial portions of his income in the
form of retainers before performing work would gain no advantage by using the ac-
crual method of accounting, because such receipts would be taxable when received even
under the accrual method. Rev. Rul. 60-85, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 181.
78. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 446(d).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(d) (2) (1957).
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) (1959).
[Vol. 66
ATTORNEYS' FEDERAL INCOME TAXES
used should permit the Internal Revenue Service to determine what the tax
liability is.81
Detailed records relating to travel, entertainment, education, promo-
tional, and club expenses are necessary, and particularly records evidencing
the business (as opposed to personal) nature of expenses of this type. 82 In
a recent case,8 3 the Tax Court wholly approved the disallowance by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue of what amounted to 82 percent of ap-
proximately 48,000 dollars claimed by an attorney as deductions (over a
period of three years) for these categories of expenses, solely or primarily on
the ground that the attorney had not shown them to be related to his
profession.
8 4
Conviction for criminal violation" of Federal income tax laws, the
imposition of the penalty 6 for failure to file a return on time,8 7 the fifty per-
cent penalty for underpayment of tax due to fraud,88 the five percent penalty
for negligent underpayment of tax80 and certain other civil penalties are de-
pendent upon the presence of (1) an understatement of tax or other viola-
tion of the Code, and (2) a state of mind of the taxpayer which is character-
ized by words such as "willfully," "reasonable cause," "willful neglect,"
"fraud," "negligence," and "intentional disregard of rules and regulations."
In applying the rules growing out of the interpretation of these words, a
taxpayer seems sometimes to be held to a higher standard if he is an attor-
ney.
90
81. Treas. Reg. § 31.6001-1(a) (1959). The accounting methods should also be
standard enough, and the entries detailed enough, that if the attorney becomes un-
available to explain them (because of death or otherwise), the rights of his estate
and his former clients will be determinable.
82. Robert R. Williams, Jr., 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 311 (1955) (compare the
court's allowance of the part of the expenses on the Hopedale trip shown to be related
to the taxpayer's profession with its disallowance of all expenses on the Miami trip).
83. Reginald G. Hearn, 36 T.C. No. 69, 1961 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc.
36.69 (1961).
84. "The expenses in question are of such nature as to afford considerable op-
portunity for abuse, and it is not too much to ask of a taxpayer seeking the benefit of
such deductions that he offer not only reasonably satisfying proof that the expenses
were in fact incurred but also that they bore a proximate relationship to the conduct
of his business." Id. at -, 1961 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. f 36.69, at 488.
85. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 7201, 7203, 7206, 7207.
86. 5% per month of tax due, with a maximum of 25%. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 6651.
87. Ibid.
88. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6653(b).
89. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6653(a).
90. In Ripperger v. United States, 248 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 940 (1958), affirming conviction under § 7203 of the 1954 Code and the corre-
sponding section of the 1939 Code for "willfully" failing to file a required return, the
court said:
He was a lawyer of 35 years of age who had been filing tax returns for
others and must have known of the duty resting upon those with an income
such as his to file tax returns. His explanation that he did not know that





1. Compensation Includible in Gross Income. Legal or other services
performed gratuitously for another do not result in gross income to an
attorney."1  However, if an attorney renders services to one person and
pursuant to a prior understanding such person pays an amount to some other
person (such as a charity), the amount so paid constitutes income to the
attorney performing the services.
9 2
If an attorney receives payment for his services in some form other
than money, then his gross income must include the fair market value of
the property or services received.93 For example, stock given by a corpora-
tion for legal services to be performed constitutes income to the attorney at
the time he receives the stock.9 4 Notes or other evidence of indebtedness re-
ceived in payment for services constitute income in the amount of their fair
market value at the time of receipt.95 If a note received as compensation is
regarded as good for its face value at maturity but does not bear interest,
the fair market value of the note is its fair discounted value computed at
the prevailing interest rate.9 6 As payments are received on such a note,
the attorney must include in his income at the time of receipt that portion
of the payment which represents the proportionate part of the discount orig-
inally taken on the entire note.
97
pay the tax is so unreasonable that the judge was thoroughly justified in not
accepting it. Id. at 945. (Emphasis added.)
In George C. Johnson, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mene. 23 (1952), appeal dismissed, August 13,
1953, the Tax Court imposed the 25% penalty for the failure to file a timely return not
shown to be due to reasonable cause, imposed by the 1939 Code equivalent of § 6651(a)
of the 1954 Code. In this case, an attorney had formed what he considered to be a
tax-free educational or religious foundation, and one of the benefits of membership was
the free preparation of tax returns by the attorney. Contributions to the foundation
found to have been paid in order to have tax returns prepared were held to be income
to the taxpayer under Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.22(a)-2. (See Treas. Reg. § 1.61- 2 (c) under
the 1954 Code.) In justifying the penalty for negligence, the court said:
Considering that petitioner was an attorney, who prepared tax returns
for others, and who failed to file his own return, we can only say his failure to
file was due to wilful neglect. George C. Johnson, supra, at 27.
But see Edward C. Koeneman, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 807 (1958), where the Tax Court
said, in refusing to impose either a fraud or a negligent penalty:
To sustain respondent [Commission of Internal Revenue] on the record
made with respect to this issue, would require us to hold that the bare failure
of an attorney possessing some knowledge of the requirements of Federal tax
law to file returns, amounts to fraud with intent to evade tax on the part of
such an attorney. This we are unwilling to do. Fraud implies bad faith, in-
tentional wrong-doing, and a sinister motive. Id. at 810.
91. Accord. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(c) (1957).
92. Accord. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(c) (1957).
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1957).
94. Allen v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1939).
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A gift received by an attorney from a client unrelated to legal services
is excluded from gross income.
8
2. Long-Term Employment. In order to reduce the higher taxes that
result from the "bunching" of income in one year, Section 1301 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 in effect permits an attorney to spread out
over two or more taxable years compensation received on account of an "em-
ployment" covering thirty-six months or more, if at least eighty percent of
the total compensation on account of such employment is received in one
taxable year.
An "employment" means an arrangement for the performance of per-
sonal services to effect a particular result.90 Fees received by an attorney
from his client under a general retainer are not subject to Section 1301 even
if the attorney spent more than thirty-six months on a single project, be-
cause the arrangement between the attorney and his client was for services
generally and not for a particular result.1°' However, an attorney may be
retained for a specific result whether or not he is also on general retainer
for a client.101 In determining whether "an employment" exists, it does not
matter that there may be more than one client, so long as the arrangement
is for a particular result."" ' The primary factor in determining whether "an
employment" exists is what the particular profession or business would
normally consider as a distinct project or result1113
Service as a trustee is an "employment.''" An attorney who is both a
fiduciary of and counsel for an estate treats his legal fees and commissions
as receipts attributable to two separate employments.'"' In certain cir-
cumstances, an attorney who, as executor, performs special legal services
may be able to treat these services as a separate employment.10 6 In a
recent suit in the District Court for refund of income taxes erroneously
paid, a jury determined'07 that an attorney had had1 separate employments
,where he had represented a single client in connection with income taxes for
separate taxable years, even though the issue was the same in each taxable
year.
98. Dupuy G. Warrick, 44 B.T.A. 1058 (1941).
99. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1301(b).
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(b)(2), Example (1) (1958).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(b) (2), Example (2) (1958); Estate of Marion B.
Pierce, 24 T.C. 95 (1955).
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(b)(1)(i) (1958). For example, an attorney might be
retained by several independent clients to have a statute or administrative rule declared
invalid.
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(b) (1) (ii) (1958). Estate of Marion B. Pierce, supra
note 101.
104. Rev. Rul. 57-436, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 588.
105. Leon R. Jillson, 22 T.C. 1101 (1954), acq. on this issue, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 5.
106. Chase v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1957), reversing 25 T.C. 398
(1955). Contra, Rosalyne A. Lesser, 17 T.C. 1479 (1952).
107. McDonnald v. United States, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 692 (D. Tex. 1961).
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In determining whether or not an employment covers a period of
thirty-six months, there is included the time spent by the attorney in un-
successful attempts to effect the desired result.108 Whether time spent in
conference and study is to be included depends upon the facts of the par-
ticular case. 109
In determining whether at least 80 percent of the compensation for the
employment is received in a single taxable year, reimbursement for ex-
penses advanced are disregarded.110 The requirement is not met if the
amounts constituting 80 percent are received in two different taxable
years,"1 as for example, in the case of a calendar year taxpayer receiving
one-half of his fee at the end of December 1961 and the other half of his fee
at the beginning of January 1962.
If an attorney is engaged in an "employment" which covers a period of
thirty-six months or more, and in a single taxable year the attorney re-
ceives at least 80 percent of the total compensation for that employment,
then the tax paid by the attorney on the amounts received in that taxable
year for the employment may be no greater than the taxes that would have
been payable if each amount received during that taxable year had instead
been received ratably between the time the employment began and the date
of receipt.112 The compensation can be received at any time during the
employment, but obviously Section 1301 is of no value if 80 percent of the
compensation is received in the year in which the employment begins.
The method of computing the limitation on tax is described in the Reg-
ulations.11 3 In general, there must first be computed the total tax that would
be payable for the year without regard to Section 1301.114 This will be the
tax for the year unless the alternative method results in less tax.1 Under
the alternate method, the tax for the year is computed excluding from in-
come the entire amount received on account of the long-term employment. 116
Then, each payment received on account of the employment during the tax-
able year must be allocated on a monthly basis between the time the em-
ployment began and the time of that payment.1 1 7 There must then be cal-
culated the increases in tax that would have occurred in prior years and
in the current year if the amounts had actually been received as allocated."
8
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(b) (1) (iv) (1958).
109. Ibid.
110. Leland v. Allen, 5 T.C. 1232 (1945).
111. Slater v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1955), reversing 21 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 212 (1952).
112. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1301(a).
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(d) (1958).
114. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(d)(1)(i) (1958).
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(d)(1)(iv) (1958).
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(d) (ii) (1958).
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(c) (1958).
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(d)(1)(iii) (1958). In determining what the increase
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The alternative tax is the sum of these increases plus the tax computed for
the year with the omission of the amounts received for the long-term em-
ployment. 119 The tax is the lesser of this amount and the tax computed
without regard to Section 1301.120
If a partnership receives compensation for a qualifying long-term em-
ployment, each member is entitled to the benefits of Section 1301, provided
that he has been a partner continuously for thirty-six months or for the
entire period of the "employment" preceding the receipt of compensation,
whichever is shorter. 121 For this purpose only, employment by the partner-
ship immediately prior to becoming a partner is considered being a partner.
22
The Regulations 123 indicate the application of Section 1301 where an at-
torney begins an employment as an individual and then becomes a member
of a partnership which continues the employment. In all applications of
Section 1301 to a partner, it is immaterial whether or not he ever performed




1. Timing of Deductions. Because of the graduated income tax rates
for individual taxpayers, 125 an item of deduction is ordinarily worth more in
a year of high income than in a year of low income. If an attorney expects
to have higher income in a future year, he should consider deferring some
of his deductions to that year.126 He may do this by deferring purchase
of depreciable property and by putting off payment 127 of deductible expenses.
Conversely, if the present taxable year shows higher income than is expected
in future years, the attorney should consider accelerating his purchases of
depreciable property, choosing 128 methods of depreciation which will result
in tax would be for prior years, adjustments must also be made to any amounts depend-
ing upon gross income, adjusted gross income, or taxable income, such as the amount of
nondeductible medical expenses, the limitation on charitable deductions, and net operat-
ing loss and capital loss carryovers. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(d) (2) (1958).
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(d) (1) (iv) (1958).
120. Ibid.
121. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1301(c) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(e) (1) (1958).
122. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1301(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(e) (4) (1958).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(e) (3) (1958).
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-2(e) (1) and (4) (1958).
125. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1.
126. In deciding whether to defer deductions and to what extent, he should con-
sider the importance to him of the immediate tax reduction and of the lost earnings on
this amount, the degree of likelihood that the high earnings will materialize in a future
year and the possible application of the rules relating to long-term employment, INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 1301.
127. If he is on the cash basis, see Part I B, p. 84 supra.
128. See Part II B7, p. 95 infra. In arriving at a decision, consideration should be
given to the effects of a particular method of depreciation on all years to which the
method will be applicable.
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in high first year deductions, and paying as many expenses as possible that
are currently deductible.
An attorney will have his tax reduced by marrying and filing a joint
return if his spouse has no gross income.' 2 9 Therefore, such an attorney
might bunch his deductions in the year before his marriage.
13 0
2. Deduction for Payment of Client's Obligation or Expense.
(a) Deduction as Business Expense. An attorney may be able to
deduct as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense 13 1 amounts vol-
untarily paid on account of a client's obligation, if he has expressly or im-
pliedly assumed that obligation as an ordinary and necessary part of render-
ing legal services.1 32 In C. Doris H. Pepper, "', a law firm had arranged for
loans (from other than institutional investors) for a client who was later
discovered to be a fraud. The lawyers repaid the lenders from their own
funds and were permitted to deduct these amounts as a business expense.
The entire transaction was held to have arisen out of the firm's trade or busi-
ness,1 :4 because finding financing for clients is often a regular part of an
attorney's practice and was in fact a small part of this firm's practice. In
holding that the payment of the creditors was "ordinary and necessary," the
court observed that "the expenditures . ..were essential to the very con-
tinuance of the petitioners' practice, for the protection of their means of
livelihood. ' ' "', Similarly, if an attorney fails to protect his client's interests
properly, he may deduct his cost of paying the client's losses or expenses re-
sulting from such failure.
136
(b) Deduction for Discharge of Guarantee of Debt. If a noncorporate
client borrows money for use in his trade or business, and his attorney guar-
antees the debt, then a payment by the attorney on account of his guarantee
is fully deductible as a business bad debt as long as the debtor's obligation
to the lender is otherwise worthless at the time of the attorney's pay-
nent. 13 If the guaranteed debt is a corporate obligation, then unless the
guarantee or payment is an ordinary and necessary part of the attorney's
129. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 1(a), 2(a), 151(b).
130. Whether or not an attorney should marry is beyond the scope of this article,
as it depends upon a number of variables, some of which are only remotely related to
federal income taxes.
131. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a).
132. C. Doris H. Pepper, 36 T.C. No. 88 (1961); Friedman v. Delaney, 171 F.2d
269, 273 (1st Cir. 1948) (concurring opinion) (dictum), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 936
(1949).
133. Supra note 132.
134. As required under INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a).
135. C. Doris H. Pepper, supra note 132, at -, 1961 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM.
DEC. 36.88, at 656.
136. Henry F. Cochrane, 23 B.T.A. 207 (1931).
137. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 166(f) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.166-8 (1959). The section
is applicable regardless of the guarantor's relationship or lack of relationship to the
debtor.
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profession,13 the payment is considered to be a nonbusiness bad debt loss, l a 9
which is treated like a short-term capital loss.' 40
(c) Deduction as Bad Debt Generally. If an attorney advances amounts
for a client and the client is obligated to reimburse the attorney, then the
attorney may deduct as a business bad debt any such debt that becomes
wholly or partially worthless 14 1 during the taxable year,'1 42 but not debts that
are merely "doubtful" as to collection.
14 '
3. Traveling Expenses. An attorney's traveling expenses 144 are non-
deductible personal expenses unless they qualify as trade or business ex-
penses or expenses for the production of income, or unless they are other-
wise deductible as charitable contributions or medical expenses.
14'
An attorney's transportation expenses (which do not include meals and
lodging) are deductible if they are ordinary and necessary expenses paid
in carrying on his trade or business.146 While ordinarily his cost of trans-
portation between a business location and his home (or any other non-
business location) is not deductible,147 he may deduct his transportation
costs for a business trip to a location away from the metropolitan area in
which his office is located, even if he goes directly from home and even if he
is not away from home overnight. 1 48 Traveling expenses, which include all
meal and lodging expenses, are deductible 1 49 if incurred while the attorney
is away from home in the pursuit of his profession."10 "Away from home"
means in this context away from home overnight.'
If an attorney travels to a destination for both business and nonbusiness
activities, then his travel expenses to and from such destination are deducti-
138. Supra p. 90.
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-8(b) (1959).
140. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 166(d) (1) (B); Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(a) (2)
(1959).
141. For factors in determining worthlessness of a debt, see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
2 (1959).
142. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 166(a).
143. Reginald G. Hearn, 36 T.C. No. 69 (1961).
144. Traveling expenses include transportation costs, meals and lodging. Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (1958).
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (5) (1958).
146. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) ; see Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 261.
147. Lenke Marot, 36 T.C. No. 23 (1961); Clarence J. Sapp, 36 T.C. No. 83
(1961) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (5) (1958); see Rev. Rul. 55-109, supra note 146.
148. See Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 261, 262.
149. To the extent that the expenses are ordinary and necessary in relation to the
attorney's profession, INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a).
150. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a) (2). A comparable rule applies where the
trip away from home is in connection with the management of property held for in-
come or for any other purpose indicated in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 212. E. M. Godson,
15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 614 (1946).
151. Al J. Smith 36 T.C. 861 (1960). A possible exception to this rule, Williams
v. Patterson, 286 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1961), is inapplicable to attorneys.
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ble only if the trip is primarily for business purposes. 152 However, if the
attorney would have had to make the trip later to accomplish the business pur-
poses that he did take care of, some of his traveling expenses to the destina-
tion may be deducted. 153 In any event, an attorney may deduct expenses in-
curred solely for business reasons, such as for a side trip solely for business.'
54
Where an attorney's evidence of expenditures is incomplete, but it ap-
pears that some deductible expenses were incurred, the court may estimate
the amounts deductible, resolving any doubts against the taxpayer. 11S But
if the attorney fails to produce any evidence to guide the court in making
an allocation between business and nonbusiness expenses, none of the ex-
penses will be deductible. 156
An attorney's deductible traveling and transportation expenses are
subtracted from his gross income to determine his adjusted gross income 57
and he may use the standard deduction in determining his taxable income.158
4. Entertainment Expenses and Social Club Fees. The propriety of
an attorney's entertaining prospective clients and the deductibility of his ex-
penses were considered in interesting detail in Robert R. Williams, Jr.159 To
cope with the serious problem of rehabilitating his law practice following
his discharge from the Navy, Williams embarked upon a deliberate, or-
ganized entertainment campaign to make as many contacts as he could with
lawyers, adjusters, and business men who might refer business to him or be-
come clients. 160 On his tax return, he deducted 1,300 dollars for 1948 and
1,450 dollars for 1949 for this and related entertainment expenses and for
business gifts. The court held that to the extent these expenditures were
reasonably calculated to maintain and increase his practice, they were de-
ductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.' 6 Williams was found
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (1) (1958). Whether expenses incurred in attending
a convention are deductible depends on the facts of each case. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(d)
(1956) ; Robert R. Williams, Jr., supra note 82.
153. Robert R. Williams, Jr., supra note 82 (Hopedale trip).
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (1) (1958).
155. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1930).
156. Robert R. Williams, Jr., supra note 82 (Miami Trip).
157. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 62(1) and (2)(B) and (C).
158. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 63(b). This is now true even if the attorney incurs
these expenses as an employee. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 62(2) (B) and (C). Under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, an employee's traveling expenses while away from
home, but not his local transportation expenses, could be deducted in addition to the
standard deduction. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 22(n) (3) ; Chester C. Hand, Sr., 16 T.C.
1410 (1951).
159. Supra note 82.
160. Id. at 317. During 1948 and 1949, every Tuesday night he and his wife enter-
tained two to four couples at their home, with the understanding that no person would
be invited back more than once in six months. In addition, he and his wife gave a
large cocktail party in the spring of each year, to which they invited over 300 guests.
id. at 314.
161. Id. at 317. The court observed, "Such practices are hardly novel or unusual,
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to have satisfied his burden of proof by establishing a pattern, proving sub-
stantial expenditures, demonstrating results, 162 and giving enough details to
permit the court to make a reasoned determination of the allowable deduc-
tion. 6 3 Making allowance for the nonbusiness motives for the entertaining,
the court allowed the deduction of one half of the amounts claimed.
No amount may be deducted for amounts spent on an attorney's own
meals while entertaining, except to the extent that it can be shown that the
expenditure was greater than the taxpayer would have made if there were
no business considerations.6 4 If he does not show evidence on this point, the
Cohan'16 5 rule will not be applied. 166
Annual dues at social clubs may be partially deductible where member-
ship has a purpose reasonably related to the attorney's practice. 67 The court
will not upset the Commissioner's determination of the allowable portion of
the expenses in the absence of evidence of specific instances of business-
related activities. 168 Initiation fees, having an indefinite useful life, must be
capitalized and are not deductible as business expenses. 69 Club assessments
for capital improvements are also not deductible as expenses, but these may
be depreciable over the life of the improvements. 70 Assessments for cur-
rent operating expenses are presumably deductible currently.' 7 '
5. Reimbursed Expenses. An attorney incurring expenses or making
advances which are to be reimbursed by his client treats these transactions
as loans. He may not deduct the amounts he advances, 7 2 and when he
particularly in those professions in which soliciting or advertising are forbidden by
ethical concepts." Id. at 318.
162. "It is clearly unrealistic to require that each particular expenditure be some-
how attributable to a particular item of future business or the establishment of a
particular future business relationship." Id. at 318. This appears to be an easier test
to meet than that indicated by the Internal Revenue Service in a letter relating to
doctors' entertainment expenses from the District Director of Internal Revenue for
Mississippi, dated June 13, 1958, 4 P-H 1960 FED. TAX SERV. 54,636, 6 CCH 1959
STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 6575, which implies that physicians in private practice may
not deduct the cost of entertaining anyone other than other doctors, .who might make
referrals, and patients, and that a general expectation to get referrals or patients as a
result of entertaining is not enough.
163. Robert R. Williams, Jr., supra note 82, at 318.
164. Gerard F. Re, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 693 (1955); Richard A. Sutter, 21
T.C. 170, 173 (1953) (dictum).
165. Cohan v. Commissioner, supra note 155. For a case where the Cohan rule
was generously applied, see James Schultz, 16 T.C. 401 (1951).
166. Richard A. Sutter, 21 T.C. 170 (1953); John W. Scott, 25 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1169 (1956).
167. Long v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1960); Reginald G. Hearn,
supra note 83.
168. Ibid.
169. Mercantile National Bank at Dallas, 30 T.C. 84 (1958).
170. Oswego Falls Corporation, 46 B.T.A. 801 (1942).
171. 2 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ff 1338.2147.
172. Reginald G. Hearn, supra note 83; Henry F. Cochrane 23 B.T.A. 207 (1931).
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receives repayment it is not included in his income. 173 If the client's obliga-
tion to repay becomes wholly or partially worthless, then the amount charged
off may be deducted as a bad debt. 174 If the client can pay, but the at-
torney forgives the debt to keep the client, the amount may be deductible
75
as a loss' 76 or as a business expense.1 7 7 Where the client disputes his obli-
gation to repay, the expenses are deductible when incurred178 and presumably
any reimbursement received is includible in income.
Expenses incurred by an attorney as an employee, under a reimburse-
ment arrangement with his employer, must be treated somewhat differently.
Since these amounts are deductible when paid, 179 it follows that the re-
imbursement must be included in taxable income, and in the year in which
it is received.180 This may result in a distortion of an attorney's income if
he advances a substantial amount in one taxable year and is reimbursed by
his employer in a different taxable year.
If an attorney who is a partner incurs expenses which are to be reim-
bursed by the partnership,' 8' then he should treat the expenses as a loan to
the partnership which is repaid upon reimbursement, in accordance with
the discussion above.'8 2  The treatment accorded employees' reimbursed
expenses is inapplicable because that treatment follows solely from Section
62 (2) (A) which relates exclusively to employees, and because the Regula-
tions 18 expressly apply only to employees. Thus there appears to be no
need for an attorney to report on his return the details concerning reimburse-
ments, unless he wants a deduction for unreimbursed expenses, such as for
deductible automobile expenses that exceed his reimbursements.1
8 4
If'an attorney who is a partner in a firm incurs business expenses in
173. Henry F. Cochrane, supra note 172.
174. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 166; Reginald G. Hearn, supra note 83 (dictum).
175. Accord, Lab Estates, Inc. 13 T.C. 811 (1949), acq., 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 3.
176. Under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165.
177. Under INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a).
178. Pittsburgh Industrial Engineering Co., 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1038 (1950)
Electric Tachometer Corp., 37 T.C. No. 20 (1961).
179. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 62 (2) (A). While Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(b) (1957)
states that § 62 creates no new deductions but merely specifies which otherwise allow-
able deductions are used to compute adjusted gross income, the matching of pay-
ments and reimbursements required, apparently on an annual basis, by Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-17(b) and (c) (1958), differs from the treatment of reimbursed expenses of
a non-employee. This different treatment seems explainable only by regarding § 62
(2) (A) as creating a deduction for reimbursable expenses for the current taxable year
not otherwise allowable.
180. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 451(a) ; Treas. Reg., § 1.451-1(a) (1957).
181. Whether or not the partnership is to be reimbursed by a client.
182. See p. 93 supra. He is treated in this transaction as if he were not a partner.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 707(a) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(a) (1956).
183. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17 (1958).
184. See Robert R. Williams, Jr., supra note 82, where an attorney was permitted
to deduct the cost of his business expenses to the extent that they exceeded the amounts
reimbursed by a partnership consisting of himself and his father.
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connection with the firm's business, then, whether or not he is reimbursed
by the firm, these amounts are not deductible by him on his return, but are
deductible only by the firm in computing its partnership income.
8,
6. Education Expenses. An attorney may deduct the expenses 8 6 of
education (including research activities) undertaken primarily to maintain or
improve the skills required in his existing professional status.'8 7 He may also
deduct the expenses of any education required by his employer for the re-
tention of his existing status.' 8 However, he may not deduct expenses of
education undertaken primarily to obtain a new position or a substantial ad-
vancement of position, or for any non-professional purposes.'8 9
An attorney practicing as a sole practitioner or as a partner deducts
these costs of education in determining his adjusted gross income, 190 and
may, in addition, take the standard deduction under Section 141 to deter-
mine his taxable income.' 91
7. Depreciation. "The allowance for depreciation is primarily intended
to provide a non-taxable fund to restore property used in producing in-
come at the end of its useful life, when its capacity to produce income has
ceased."
19 2
"A deduction for depreciation is allowable if the property used in the
trade or business of taxpayer [sic] is shown to have a useful life for a
limited period in the taxpayer's business or in the production of his income.
185. Estate of Charles 0. Gunther, Jr., 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 913 (1954);
Western Construction Company, 14 T.C. 453, 471 (1950) ; Hiram C. Wilson, 17 B.T.A.
976 (1929).
186. Including tuition, travel, meals, and lodging to the extent that these ex-
penses are incurred primarily to obtain education qualifying for deduction. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-5(d) (1958).
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1958); Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307
(2d Cir. 1953). See Bistline v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Idaho 1956), where
an attorney's tuition and hotel expenses in attending a federal tax course were deductible
as business expenses, except to the extent that he was reimbursed therefor.
188. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(2) (1958).
189. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) and (e), Example (2) (1958). Compare Arnold
Namrow, 33 T.C. 419 (1959) (psychiatrists denied deduction for cost of training to
become psychoanalysts) with John S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014 (1959) (physician using
psychiatric methods in diagnosing and treating patients in his general practice may
deduct costs of training in analysis and techniques of psychiatry to be used in his gen-
eral practice). However, differences between the general practice of an attorney and
the general practice of a physician may lead to different results in otherwise comparable
cases.
190. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 62 (1).
191. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 69. An employed attorney may deduct his
transportation, meals, and lodging expenses (if away from home overnight), INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 62 (2) (B), or his transportation expenses alone (if not away from
home overnight), INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 62 (2) (C), in determining his adjusted
gross income, but his expenses for tuition, books, and similar items may be deducted
only if he does not take the standard deduction.
192. 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23.01 (1960).
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The limited period need only be estimated with reasonable accuracy." 193
An attorney's property subject to depreciation includes tangible prop-
erty used in his profession (or held for the production of income), but not
inventories or land.19 4 He may depreciate desks, bookcases, typewriters and
other office equipment and furnishings. He may also depreciate books, texts,
and reports to be used for more than one year,19' but no deduction is al-
lowable if he cannot show the cost of the property and when it was pur-
chased.'9 6 He may take depreciation deductions for his automobile to the ex-
tent he uses it in his profession. 197 An attorney's home does not give rise
to depreciation deductions, even if he conducts some business there,198 un-
less he has a room used primarily for his profession. 19 9 Intangible property
is also depreciable, if its useful life is limited to a period that can be esti-
mated with reasonable accuracy. 200 An agreement not to compete is subject
to depreciation if it is limited in time and if the taxpayer's cost is determin-
able.201 If an attorney purchases the files of a retiring or deceased attorney
and can show the price allocated to these files and that the files would be
useful for a limited period only, then he may be able to depreciate the cost
of the files.
2 2
The timing of the depreciation deductions within the property's useful
life is, within limits, subject to the attorney's determination. If an attorney
purchases depreciable tangible personal property, which has a useful life of
six years or more, then in the year in which he would otherwise first be
entitled to a depreciation deduction he may elect to take a special depreciation
deduction equal to 20 percent of the cost of the property. 203 In the case of a
husband and wife filing a joint return, the deduction is applicable only to the
first 20,000 dollars of cost of such property.20 4 In the case of all other eligible
193. Chester R. Johnson, Jr. v. United States, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 79,674, 79,676
(W.D. Tex. 1961).
194. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(a) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)2 (1956).
195. Louis Boehm, 35 B.T.A. 1106 (1937).
196. Morris Schwartz, 1961 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. ff 61,144; Louis
Boehm 35 B.T.A. 1106 (1937).
197. Robert R. Williams, Jr., supra note 82.
198. See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3) (1958).
199. Morris Schwartz, 1961 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 61,144.
200. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(3) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6452, 1960-1 Cum.
BULL. 127. But only the straight line method of depreciation is permissible. INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 167(b) and (c).
201. Standard Lumber & Hardware Co., 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 683 (1958)
see Simon Harris, 1961 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEC. 61,035.
202. In Chester R. Johnson, Jr. v. United States, supra note 193, an obstetrician who
purchased the patient records of a retiring obstetrician was allowed to depreciate the
amount paid, because he showed that he paid $4.50 for each record which was reasonable
because otherwise the doctor would have had to get the information by spending $30
worth of time with each patient for which he could not charge, and that the records
had a limited useful life because of patients' mobility and limited child-bearing years.
203. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 179.
204. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 179(b).
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taxpayers,20 5 the limitation is 10,000 dollars of cost.2 6 If an attorney elects
to take the special deduction under Section 179, his basis for depreciation
207
is reduced by the amount of the special deduction, before the regular de-
preciation deductions are computed.
208
An attorney may choose among several methods of depreciation. The
straight-line method of depreciation is applied by starting with the adjusted
basis of the property 2 9 and subtracting the salvage value,2 1 0 which is the
estimated proceeds that he will receive upon the sale of the property when
it is no longer useful to him. 21 ' The balance is divided by the number of
years of useful life, and the quotient is the depreciation deduction for each
full year of use. 212 If less than a full year is involved (in the year of acquisi-
tion, the year of sale, or a "short period" 213 taxable year), then only a pro-
portional part of the deduction is allowed. 214 Assets depreciated on the
straight-line method may be treated as group, classified, or composite ac-
counts.
215
Other methods of depreciation permit the depreciable cost to be deducted
more rapidly than the straight-line method, although under all methods the
total amounts deductible over the years will be the same (adjusted basis less
salvage value) .216 These methods may be used only in the case of tangible
property with a useful life of three years or more, constructed or acquired un-
used by the taxpayer after 1953.217 Different methods may be used for different
assets.218 Whether an attorney would want to use accelerated methods of
depreciation (and the special deduction allowed by Section 179) would de-
pend upon a number of factors, including his present tax bracket, his ex-
pected tax bracket in future years, his need for the increased funds that
would result from reduced current taxes, and the expense of any increased
bookkeeping or accounting required.
8. Charitable Contributions. The value of legal or other services con-
205. The special depreciation deduction is not available to trusts. INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 179(d) (4). For special rules in the case of an estate and its heirs, legatees,
and devisees, see INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 179(d) (5), and Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2
(b) (1960).
206. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 179(b).
207. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(f).
208. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 179(d) (8).
209. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 167(f), 1011.
210. Treas. Reg. 1.167(b)-l(a) (1956).
211. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-I(c) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6507, 1960-2 Cum.
BULL. 91.
212. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1(a) (1956).
213. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 443(a).
214. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1(b), Example (1) (1956).
215. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-l(b), Examples (2) and (3) (1956).
216. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-0(a) (1956).
217. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(b) and (c).
218. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-0(c) (1956).
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tributed to charitable institutions is not deductible. 219 However, unreim-
bursed traveling expenses incurred while away from home in connection
with such gratuitous services are deductible as charitable contributions.
220
Query whether an attorney may deduct as a charitable contribution the
wages or salary paid to his employee on account of time spent by the em-
ployee in working for a charitable institution.
Dues paid to a charitable organization are not deductible if the payment
bestows upon the payor certain benefits, such as journals, free use of facili-
ties, and similar rights.221 However, these dues might qualify as ordinary
and necessary business expenses22 2 or perhaps as ordinary and necessary
expenses paid for the production of income. 22 3 The purchase price of theater
tickets or other privileges or property bought from a charitable organization
is deductible only to the extent that the price paid exceeds the fair market
value of the privilege or property received.
2 24
9. Forwarding Fees. Some question exists whether an attorney paying
a forwarding fee 225 may deduct it as a business expense. 226 In order to
qualify as a business expense, the payment would have to be "ordinary" '22 7
("normal, usual, and customary in the profession and in the community"),228
"necessary '229 ("appropriate and helpful in obtaining business"), 210 and of
such a nature as would not "frustrate sharply defined National or State
policies evidenced by a governmental declaration proscribing particular types
of conduct. '23 1  Whether a payment of a forwarding fee meets these re-
quirements may depend upon the facts of the particular case.
The requirement that the payment must not frustrate sharply defined
national or state policies is based upon the decision in Lilly v. Coinmis-
219. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(a) (2) (1958) ; O.D. 712, 3 Cum. BULL. 188.
220. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(a) (2) (1958) Rev. Rul. 55-4, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 291.
221. Rev. Rul. 55-565, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 95.
222. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) ; Rev. Rul. 55-565, supra note 221.
223. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 212.
224. See Harold DeJong, 38 T.C. No. 89 (1961) ; Cf. Rev. Rul. 56-120, 1956-1 Cum.
BULL. 514 (admissions tax); Rev. Rul. 61-126, 1961 INT. REV. BULL. No. 42, at 20.
225. In this discussion, a forwarding fee means a payment by an attorney, who
performed services for a client, to another attorney who rendered no services to the
client but sent the client to the attorney paying the forwarding fee.
226. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a).
227. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a).
228. I. T. 4096, Rev. Rul. 18-13910, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 91 (dealing with fee
splitting by a surgeon with a referring physician). This requirement of the ruling
appears to impose a greater burden on the person desiring to deduct the forwarding
fee than is imposed in the case relied on by the ruling, Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S.
90, 93, 97 (1952), where the test seemed to be whether the practice was common in
the profession in that area only.
229. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a).
230. I. T. 4096, supra note 228.
231. Ibid.
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sioner'2 3 2 which distinguishes between sharply defined national or state
policies and the attitudes of organized professional groups.
233
Canon 28 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association provides:
It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes
of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring
suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those
with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds
of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents
or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or in-
directly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases
to his office . . . . (Emphasis added.)
Canon 34 provides:
No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with an-
other lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.
The purpose of Canon 34 is to condemn forwarding fees.
23 4
In Pennsylvania, the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association have been cited as authority for disbarment.23 5 The local
bar associations play an official part in disbarment proceedings, 2 6 and the
bar's' investigating committee may be given the power to issue subpoenas
and administer oaths. 237 However, whether the requirements of the Canons
of Ethics and the policies of bar associations constitute sharply defined
national or state policies proscribing forwarding fees has not been decided.
23 8
232. Supra note 228.
233. Id. at 97.
234. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 186 (1954). Where a client specifically agrees that
the forwarding lawyer should receive a forwarding fee, the Canon is not violated.
Id. at 188.
235. See In re Disbarment Proceedings, 321 Pa. 81, 95, 184 Atl. 59, 65 (1936).
236. See In re Disbarment Proceedings, supra note 235; Samuel W. Salus's
Case, 321 Pa. 103, 184 Atil. 69 (1936).
237. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1665 (Supp. 1960), In re Disbarment Proceedings,
supra note 235.
238. The line of cases permitting exclusion from gross income of rebates to cus-
tomers or their employees, e.g., Marlon E. Pew, Jr., 1961 P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM.
DEC. 61,264; Harmony Dairy Co., 1960 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. i" 60,109;
Rosedale Dairy Co., 26 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 951 (1957); Pittsburgh Milk Co., 26
T.C. 707 (1956), nonacq., 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 6, would seem to be inapplicable to for-
warding fees of which the client is ignorant, because these cases treat the amounts re-
funded as deposits to be returned in all events, Pittsburgh Milk Co., supra at 716.
There is no agreement that the portion of the fee paid by the client which is equal to
such a forwarding fee is to be returned to the client, nor is there any agreement with
the client that that portion will be paid to another. The fee belongs entirely to the
attorney, to be used by him as he sees fit, and it is all part of his gross income. How-
ever, where the client pays a fee to an attorney with the understanding that a part is
to be paid to another, then the first attorney is merely a conduit or agent for the client,
and the cases cited in this note would appear to be relevant.
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